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How liberal tests are does not merely depend on their content, but also their effects 
Kees Groenendijk and Ricky van Oers* 
In his contribution Christian Joppke correctly disqualifies citizenship tests scrutinising future citizens’ 
inner dispositions as being unjustifiable from a liberal point of view.10 Citizenship tests that assess 
cognitive knowledge can, in his view, be qualified as liberal. This qualification of knowledge tests as 
liberal and tests judging the applicant’s ‘inner dispositions’ as illiberal, however, requires some 
refining. Ines Michalowski already notes in her contribution that an evaluation of citizenship tests 
should not only ask what these tests require from the candidate, but that it is also important to analyse 
to what extent states use citizenship tests as an instrument to ‘regulate possible dissent that emerges 
from a culturally and religiously diverse population.’ As an example, she mentions that certain 
questions from the Dutch citizenship test regarding an applicant’s cognitive knowledge of Dutch 
social norms and values should be qualified as illiberal. These questions suggest a supposed general 
acceptance of social norms among the Dutch population, whereas acceptance of these norms is not 
necessary for a liberal democracy.  
To this refinement, we would like to add that the question regarding the justifiability of a 
citizenship test in a liberal democratic perspective can only be answered when the effects a citizenship 
test produces are taken into account. A citizenship test which puts up a barrier for lower-educated, 
less-well-off immigrants is hard to justify from a liberal point of view, how liberal its content may be. 
The devil, like Joppke states, is indeed in the detail, and these details hence deserve some elaboration. 
We will illustrate our position on the basis of the cases of the Netherlands and the UK.  
In the Netherlands the possession of Dutch high school (or higher) diplomas leads to exemption 
from the requirement to pass a citizenship test for naturalisation. This implies that the citizenship test 
will primarily affect first generation of immigrants, who have generally not followed education in the 
Netherlands, and second generation school drop-outs, the number of which is exceptionally high in the 
Netherlands.11 Next to the socio-economic problems the latter category will experience will now also 
be added legal problems: an extra barrier will be put up in the form of an expensive (at least € 230) 
and complicated citizenship test that will stand in the way of full citizenship and permanent residence 
rights.  
Empirical research conducted in the Netherlands (Van Oers 2006) has indeed shown that the 
citizenship test puts up a barrier for naturalisation. After the introduction of the test in April 2003 
naturalisations decreased by 50%.12 From 1 April 2003, the date the test was introduced, until 1 
September 2006, a bit over half of all those who registered to take the test eventually passed it. In 
addition, many immigrants did not register to take the test in the first place, out of fear that they would 
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10 To this observation we would like to add that not only citizenship tests are used as means to scrutinise an applicant’s 
inner dispositions. Recently, an applicant who forced his wife to wear a full Islamic veil was refused French citizenship 
for a lacking desire of integration (‘Besson refuse par décret de naturaliser un homme imposant le voile à sa femme’, Le 
Monde, 2 February 2010). A comparable example can be found in the Netherlands, where the wife of an imam was 
refused naturalisation for her supposedly insufficient integration (Council of State, 6 August 2006).  
11 ‘Het mbo is de blinde vlek’, De Groene Amsterdammer, 21 January 2010. 
12 The numbers reached an all-time low in 2004 and 2005 (14,752 and 14,893 naturalisations respectively), when more than 
50% fewer persons were naturalised compared to 2002 (29,299 naturalisations), the year before the revised Dutch 
Nationality Act, introducing the naturalisation test, entered into force. The total number of naturalisations in 2008 is still 
44% lower than the level reached in 2002. 
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not pass the costly test, for which no studying material has been made available. It is difficult to 
prepare for a test in case the test subjects are kept secret. From interviews conducted with those 
charged with implementing the test and with immigrants themselves it became apparent that the test 
constitutes a particularly high barrier for weaker groups in society, such as the elderly, women in 
disadvantaged positions and persons who have not had any or only little education. For this category, 
the test has hence not led to an improved integration, which was one of the official aims of the test, but 
rather the opposite: immigrants in this category gave up their wish for full membership. The test thus 
creates extra barriers for lower-educated immigrants who lack the financial means to obtain the level 
required by the test. This is difficult to justify in respect of the principle of equal treatment of all 
citizens in a liberal democracy.  
In comparison to the low pass rate for the Dutch naturalisation test, the average pass rate of the 
British ‘Life in the UK’ test is high: 73% of all tests taken have been successful.13 Still, a significant 
proportion of potential applicants for naturalisation and permanent residence (more than 25%) is being 
held back by actual test failures (Ryan 2008: 313).14 Furthermore, when taking a closer look at the 
pass rates for the test per nationality, it becomes apparent that the test constitutes an especially high 
barrier for certain categories of immigrant: family migrants and refugees. Whereas the pass rate is 
almost 100% for applicants holding the nationality of a country where English is the majority 
language (USA, Australia), less than half of all tests taken by immigrants holding the nationality of a 
country which has produced large numbers of refugees (Iraq, Kosovo and Afghanistan) or applicants 
for family reunification (Bangladesh, Turkey) are successful. The impact of the introduction of one 
uniform test is highly differentiated per nationality and is probably differentiated by immigration 
category (Ryan 2008: 303). It is therefore in our view questionable whether the British test, which has 
a ‘good’ reputation when it comes to its content (Michalowski 2009) can be justified when measured 
against liberal standards.  
An overall evaluation of citizenship tests should not only be based on the content of these tests 
(Joppke) and the extent to which states use the tests to define cultural and religious difference as a 
public issue that may require state interference (Michalowski), but also on the effects these tests 
produce in terms of excluding a significant part of the permanent resident population from full 
citizenship rights. Important differences in terms of access to full citizenship are not easy to justify 
from a liberal democratic perspective.  
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